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Introduction 
Many firms around the world are owned and controlled by families, by the founder directly, 
or by the founder’s offspring. In fact, families control even very large listed firms. There is, 
however,  a  significant  cross country  variation  in  the  importance  of  family  firms  and  how 
concentrated family ownership and control are (La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). 
Some argue that family firms are efficient responses to institutional and market environments 
(Villalonga & Amit, 2006), while others argue that family control and ownership concentration 
are only substitutes for poor institutions regarding such things as investor protection (Burkart, 
Panunzi, & Shleifer, 2003). Across the world, family firms often resort to some sort of control 
enhancing mechanism to ascertain control (Morck, Wolfenzon, & Bernard, 2005). One important 
aspect of family firms, which is the focus of this paper, is the transfer of control and ownership 
across generations. Does it matter for the returns on investment who manages the family firm?  
This  paper  evaluates  three  governance  aspects  of  the  family  firm:  the  effect  of  family 
ownership,  control,  and  management.  First,  we  examine  whether  there  is  a  difference  in 
investment performance between family and non family firms. We then examine whether there 
are any differences in a firm’s investment performance if the firm is managed by the founder, 
compared to when the firm is managed by a descendant of the founder, or alternatively by an 
external manager without family affiliation. Finally, we also study how the use of dual class 
shares affects the returns on investments in family firms and non family firms.    
The study adds to the existing literature on family firms in a number of ways, foremost by 
examining the effects of family ownership, control, and management in a corporate governance 
setting  characterized  by  a  highly  concentrated  ownership  structure  and  an  extensive  use  of 
control instruments such as dual class shares.  In the analysis  we use a  unique panel of 246 
Swedish listed firms, out of which 85 are family firms. The data covers a period of 15 years   3 
(1990 to 2005). Previous studies on family ownership and control use either cross sectional data 
or a much shorter time period. The study therefore adds to the more general literature on the 
effects and the development of best practice corporate governance structures
3 as well as to the 
literature on family firms.  
  The study also contributes methodologically to previous research by using an alternative 
measure  of  firm  performance  –  marginal  q.  Marginal  q  measures  the  return  on  investments 
relative to the cost of capital.
4 Marginal q has the advantage that it is unlikely to be endogenous 
to ownership, as might be the case with Tobin’s q (Gugler et al., 2004b; Gugler & Yurtoglu, 
2003; Mueller & Reardon, 1993). Furthermore, marginal q is appealing from a theoretical point 
of  view  since,  in  contrast  to  market to book  measures  of  average  q,  it  only  measures  the 
marginal return on capital, which is appropriate when apprising investment performance.
5  
The analysis shows that there are no significant differences between family firms and non 
family firms. There are, however, significant differences between family firms and non family 
firms in the use of dual class shares. The descriptive statistics show that almost 80 percent of the 
sample firms apply a dual class share structure compared to 54 percent of the non family firms. 
The regression results indicate that dual class shares have a negative and significant effect on 
firm investment performance; the effect is much higher in family firms than in non family firms.  
The results show that a founder management has no abnormal effect on the firm’s investment 
performance. When examining the effect of descendant managers in family firms, the results 
show  a  significantly  negative  relationship  between  descendant  management  and  firms’ 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Gugler, Mueller, & Yurtoglu, (2004b) for an overview of the literature. 
4 Marginal q is a measure of what Tobin, (1984) referred to as the functional efficiency of capital markets. We use 
the marginal q derived by Mueller & Reardon, (1993).  
5 Hayashi, (1982) shows that only under very restrictive assumptions will marginal q and average q equate. Firms 
need, for example, to operate in perfectly competitive markets, and their production and instalment functions must 
be homogeneous. These are very unrealistic assumptions which, if they do not hold, make market to book measures 
of  Tobin’s  q  inappropriate  as  performance  measures.  In  addition,  market to book  measures  have  a  number  of 
measurement  problems  that  are  significantly  reduced  when  using  a  marginal  q  approach.  For  a  discussion  of 
measurement problems associated with Tobin’s q see Lewellen & Badrinath, (1997).     4 
investment performance. The result confirms the study by Pérez González, (2006). The value of 
marginal q equals 0.3, which implies over investment, meaning that the manager does not act in 
the interest of the shareholders; rather he/she caters to his/her own interests at the expense of 
other  shareholders.  The  proposed  reason  for  this  is  that  a  descendant  is  often  given  the 
managerial position due to his/her relationship to the family and not explicitly due to his/her 
skills. The effects of an external manager as chief executive officer (CEO) and/or chairman of 
the  board  (COB)  are  then  examined.  The  results  show  a  positive  and  significant  effect 
concerning external managers’ effect on investment performance. These firms have, on average, 
a marginal q of 1.4, indicating under investment. That is, the return on investment is higher than 
the  cost  of  capital.  In  this  case,  the  manager  can  improve  firm  value  by  investing  in  more 
projects with a positive net present value. To sum up, the results demonstrate that family control 
through  dual class  shares  has  a  negative  effect  on  firm  investment  performance.  External 
managers as successors are value enhancing compared to descendants in family firms applying 
dual class shares. 
  The  rest  of  the  paper  is  outlined  as  follows.  The  first  section  presents  a  theoretical 
framework and an overview of the previous literature, it also develops the hypotheses tested. The 
method  section  discusses  the  marginal  q  methodology  and  the  data  set  used.  The  section 
thereafter  discusses  the  descriptive  statistics  and  the  regression  results.  The  last  section 
summarizes and concludes the paper.   
 
Family Firms and Corporate Governance 
There is an extensive literature analysing family firms (see, among others, Andres, 2008; 
Astrachan & Shanker, 2003; Burkart et al., 2003; Hagelin, Holmén, & Pramborg, 2006; Miller, 
Le Breton Miller, Lester, & Cannella Jr, 2007; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). In the literature there   5 
is no general consensus on how to define a family firm, rather several different definitions exist 
(Casillas & Acedo, 2007; La Porta et al., 1999). A recent research report on family business in 
Europe concluded that there exist over 90 different definitions of what a family firm actually is 
(Mandl,  2008).  Most  definitions  have,  however,  in  common  that  they  relate  to  ownership, 
control, and management of the firm. For example, Villalonga and Amit, (2006), define a family 
firm as a firm that has the founder of the firm, a blood relative, or an in law acting as a CEO or 
as a block holder, whereas La Porta et al., (1999) use various levels of control (10 and 20 percent 
of voting rights) when defining family firms.  
Astrachan and Shanker, (2003) set up three criteria for family firms. The first criterion refers 
to  the  ownership  share  that  the  founder  family  has  in  the  firm  (Anderson  &  Reeb,  2003a; 
Villalonga & Amit, 2006). The second criterion refers to whether the family has strategic control 
of the firm (Cronqvist  & Nilsson, 2003). The  third criterion takes into account the  family’s 
involvement in the management of the firm and intention to keep the firm within the family 
(Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004).  
In this paper, we distinguish between family firms and non family firms. We define a firm as 
a family firm if the controlling owner is the founder, an heir, or a member of the founder family. 
Control is inferred at 20 per cent. With dispersed ownership structure, it can be assumed that less 
than 50 percent of the voting rights are sufficient to de facto control a firm (Claessens, Simeon, 
Fan, & Lang, 2002; La Porta et al., 1999; Morck et al., 2005). Further, we distinguish between 
three  types  of  family  firms,  or  more  precisely,  three  management  categories:  founder, 
descendant, and external management. To determine type of management, we identify who holds 
the position as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and who holds the position as Chairman of the 
Board (COB). Thus, we distinguish between the following three categories of management: (1) 
founder CEO and/or COB, (2) descendant CEO and/or COB, and (3) externally hired CEO   6 
and/or COB. If, for example, the CEO is a descendant and the COB is the founder, the firm is 
coded as being managed by the founder. Likewise, if the COB is a descendant and the CEO is an 
external manager, the firm is coded as being managed by a descendant; only if both the CEO and 
the COB are external (non family) is the firm treated as being under external management. The 
definition of founder family control applied follows, among others, Anderson & Reeb, (2003a 
and b), Barontini & Caprio, (2006), and Villalonga & Amit, (2006). 
     
Family Ownership and Control 
There are several studies of how ownership affects a firm’s financial performance specific to 
family ownership; many of these studies use, however, data on Anglo Saxon firms. In general, 
the empirical literature seems to suggest that founding family ownership and management has a 
positive impact on firm performance (Andres, 2008; Barontini & Caprio, 2006). For example, 
Anderson and Reeb, (2003a and b) show that US based founder family firms perform better than 
non family  firms.  The  impact  of ownership  on firm performance  is,  however,  non linear.  In 
another study, Anderson et al., (2003) show that the cost of debt is lower in founder family firms 
than in non family firms and that founder family firms do not have lower risk in terms of capital 
and debt structure than non founder family firms Anderson and Reeb, (2003b). Consequently, 
they conclude that family ownership is a beneficial organizational structure from which bond 
holders, management, and minority shareholders benefit. Villalonga & Amit, (2006) also show a 
positive effect of family ownership on firm performance. In line with the studies by Anderson 
and  others  they  conclude  that  minority  shareholders  in  family  firms  are  better  off  than 
shareholders in non family firms. The same patterns also seem to hold for Continental European 
firms (Andres, 2008; Barontini & Caprio, 2006).    7 
Theoretically there are, however, both potential benefits and potential costs associated with 
family ownership and control. The potential benefits of family ownership are related to the fact 
that families as owners are considered to have strong economic incentives to closely monitor the 
management of the firm and hence to decrease costs associated with potential principal agent 
conflicts (Andres, 2008; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Controlling owners who hold large stakes in 
the firm can be assumed to have strong incentives to monitor the management of the firm and 
thereby  lower  managerial  entrenchment  as  well  as  the  free riding  problem  associated  with 
dispersed ownership. The level of motivation for monitoring the management is based on the 
controlling owners’ proportion of the firm’s cash flow rights. The more cash flow rights held by 
a shareholder, the stronger the incentive for monitoring the management of the firm (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1986 1997). The incentives to both expropriate minority shareholders and monitor the 
management are stronger in family firms than with other types of controlling owners since the 
private benefits of control are concentrated to the family and not diluted among several different 
stakeholders as is the case with other controlling owners (Villalonga & Amit, 2006).  
Many of the characteristics of families as owners are associated with their strong personal 
attachment  to  the  firm.  Andres  (2008)  lists  a  number  of  reasons  why  families  could  be 
considered as a special type of owners and why they have stronger incentives to monitor the 
management. For example, the family has in many cases invested a large part of personal wealth 
in the company and often has a relatively less diversified investment portfolio compared to other 
financial investors. That is, the family has a strong attachment to the firm, both financially and 
emotionally. Families are often also regarded to have a longer time horizon in their investment, a 
quality  that  affects  firm  reputation,  contacts  with  suppliers  and  customers,  and  investment 
decisions. Hence, hypothesis one can be formulated accordingly: 
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Hypothesis 1. Family firms have a superior investment performance vis à vis non family firms.  
 
There are also costs associated with family ownership and control that might occur as a result 
of the controlling shareholders’ extraction of private benefits from the firm. The cost of these 
private  benefits  is  borne  by  the  minority  shareholders.  With  private  benefits  of  control,  the 
controlling shareholders can increase their utility and private wealth. Hence, controlling owners 
can get personal financial benefits and personal non financial benefits from the management of 
the firm (Ehrhardt & Nowak, 2003). Controlling shareholders with a small portion of cash flow 
rights  have  larger  incentives  for  expropriating  minority  shareholders  if  the  legal  minority 
protection is weak and the expected costs are low (La Porta et al., 1999). Previous research has 
shown that the use of control enhancing mechanisms such as vote differentiated shares is much 
more common in family firms than in non family firms. Hence, one can assume that the effect is 
larger in family firms. Based on this discussion, we formulate hypothesis two:  
 
Hypothesis  2.  Separation  of  ownership  and  control  due  to  vote differentiated  shares  has  a 
negative impact on investment performance.  
 
Family management 
According to our categorization, a family firm can be managed in three different ways: (1) by 
the founder of the firm (founder management), (2) by the founder’s descendants (descendant 
management,  defined  as  anyone  with  a  family  bond  to  the  founder),  and  (3)  by  external 
managers (external management). 
A founder is an entrepreneur who has three significant basic endowments that help a firm to 
grow and increase the likelihood of success: (1) entrepreneurial spirit, (2) human capital, and (3)   9 
venture capital (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2004). The founder can be assumed to have distinct 
characteristics in terms of expertise and entrepreneurial abilities that positively affect the firm’s 
investment performance (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Anderson & Reeb (2003a) establish that 
when a family member (founder or descendant) serves as the CEO, the firm’s performance is 
significantly enhanced, compared to when an external manager serves as the CEO. The market 
performance of a family firm with the founder as the CEO also appears to be higher than when a 
descendant serves as the CEO. Based on this reasoning, we formulate hypothesis three: 
 
Hypothesis 3:  Founder management has a positive impact on investment performance. 
 
A founder’s abilities are not automatically transferred to the descendants or heirs. A founder 
who resigns has three options of handing over the firm: (1) he/she can sell the firm on the capital 
market, (2) he/she can hire an external manager to run the firm, or (3) the founder can appoint a 
family member to take the managerial position (Burkart et al., 2003). It can be assumed that 
founders increase their own welfare when selling to outside investors if the family keeps the 
control. Further, by handing over the firm to the founder’s successors, the family as controlling 
owner  will  be  able  to  reduce  the  agency  cost  as  described  in  the  previous  section.  Pérez 
González  (2006)  confirms  the  prediction  of  Burkart  et  al.’s  model.  He  shows  that  family 
descendants holding a CEO position reduce firm performance. The return on assets decreased on 
average by 18 percent within three years, compared to the case when an external manager took 
over as CEO.  
  Villalonga and Amit (2006) made a similar study using Fortune 500 firms. They show 
that family control increases firm performance but only when the founder serves as the CEO 
and/or COB, whereas a descendant CEO has a negative effect on firm value. That is, the result   10 
shows that if the appointed manager from the family has no or little experience in the area, and is 
only elected because of his/her family relationship, the firm value will be negatively affected. In 
addition, there is a great deal of anecdotal evidence that controlling owners in their third or 
fourth generation do more damage than they contribute to the success of the firm (Landes, 2006).  
This discussion forms the fourth hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4:  Descendant management has a negative impact on investment performance. 
 
As mentioned, appointing  a family  member to a  managerial position  can be costly if the 
family member does not have the right skills and thereby makes inferior investment decisions. 
Therefore, in many cases, an external manager with the proper knowledge and business know 
how can be expected to have greater ability to manage the firm than family descendants (Pérez 
González, 2006). The fifth hypothesis is formulated accordingly: 
 




Tobin’s q is one of the most commonly applied measures of firm performance. It measures 
the average return on capital relative to the firm’s cost of capital. A Tobin’s q above one implies 
that the average return on capital is higher than the cost of capital. As with other accounting 
measures, Tobin’s q suffers from some crucial drawbacks, of which the most serious is that it 
confuses average and marginal returns on investment. It also fails to account properly for firm 
specific costs of capital and risk.    11 
 
Marginal q  
In this study, we use marginal q (qm) as a performance measure. Marginal q measures the 
change in the market value of a firm due to the change in assets (investment) that caused it. 
Mueller  &  Reardon  (1993)  derive  marginal  q  acknowledging  the  fact  that  market  value 
investments are the discounted present value of future cash flows created by the investments.
6 
The estimation method allows each firm a firm specific depreciation rate. Hence, qm is a more 
accurate measure to use when evaluating firm performance, since it is the return on the marginal 
investment  rather  than  the  average  that  shows  whether  the  firm  is  over   or  under investing 
relative to its cost of capital. The interpretation is straightforward; a qm equal to one implies that 
firm value is maximized, a qm less than one implies over investment, i.e., the marginal return is 
lower than the cost of capital, and a qm above one implies under investment, the marginal return 



















M M  
δ               (1) 
 
Mt, is the total market value of the firm, i.e., defined as market value of equity plus total debt, –δ  
is the depreciation rate,
7 It is the investment, and qm is the estimated marginal q. Equation (1) 
assumes an efficient capital market in the sense that future cash flows are unbiased estimates. 
From this it follows that as t grows larger, the term µt/Mt-1 approaches zero.  
                                                 
6 See Appendix for a derivation of marginal q from Tobin’s average q.  
7 More technically, δ should be interpreted as the systematic change in market value of the capital stock in place (Kt-
1). In normal cases this can be thought of as the depreciation rate; however, under certain circumstances δ can be 
positive due to re evaluation of the market value (Bjuggren, Eklund, & Wiberg, 2007).    12 
Note that the depreciation rate is estimated as the intercept, and as such, no assumptions 
regarding the speed of asset decay are necessary. Further, since we use fixed effects estimations, 
the depreciation rate is allowed to vary across time and firms.  
To  estimate  the  effect  of  management,  ownership,  and  control  we  interact  the  dummy 
variables with It/Mt-1 from equation (1), which yields the functional form: Z X Y 2 1 β β α + + = , 



































1 ...     (2) 
 
where the Zs represent the explanatory variables. The sum of the marginal effect in equation (2) 
corresponds to marginal q:  
 
i i m Z Z q 1 1 2 1 + + + + = β β β K                 (3) 
 
Data  
The data for the empirical investigation consists of an unbalanced panel of 256 Swedish listed 
firms  during  the  period  1990 2005.  Out  of  these,  85  firms  were  classified  as  family  firms 
according  to  our  definition  (family  ownership  inferred  at  20  percent  or  more  of  the  voting 
rights). All firms in the sample are Swedish domiciled listed companies on the Stockholm Stock 
Exchange and on the Nordic Growth Market (NGM). To be included, each firm needs to provide 
data  for  a  minimum  of  four  consecutive  years.  The  whole  sample  contains  1518  firm year 
observations representing 246 firms over a 15 year period (85 family firms with 497 firm year 
observations). Table 1 presents the variables used.  
   13 
Table 1. Variables and Definitions 
Variables  Definition 
Family Firm  Dummy  variable  indicating  family  ownership;  equals  1  if  the 
controlling  owner  is  the  founder,  an  heir,  or  a  member  of  the 
founder family firm, and 0 otherwise. Family control is inferred at 
20 percent.  
Founder Management  Founder dummy variable; equals 1 if the founder is the CEO or 
COB, 0 otherwise
a). 
Descendant Management   Descendent  dummy  variable;  equals  1  if  a  descendent  of  the 
founder is the CEO or COB, and 0 otherwise
a).  
External Management  External  manager  dummy  variable;  equals  1  if  a  non family 
member of the founder is the CEO or COB, 0 otherwise
a). 
Capital  Share  of  capital/cash  flow  rights  controlled  by  the  firm’s  single 
largest shareholder, in percent. 
Votes  Share of votes controlled by the firm’s single largest shareholder, in 
percent. 
Vote diff.  Vote  differentiation  dummy;  equals  1  if  the  firm  has  a  vote 
differentiated share structure and 0 otherwise. 










b: I = after tax profits (G378) + Depreciation (G399) – 
Dividends (G425) +  Debt (G135 and G132) +  Equity (G679 and 
G670) + R&D (G625) + ADV (approximated by G612), where 
 Debt and  Equity are funds raised by new debt and equity issues. 
  
∆ Market value  Change in total market value between periods t-1 and t.  
(Mt Mt 1)/Mt 1) 
 
Investment intensity  Investments in






Notes:  a) CEO refers to Chief Executive Officer and COB to Chairman of the Board. b) Compustat Global item numbers are within parentheses.  
 
 
  The financial data were collected from Standard & Poor’s Compustat Global Database. The 
data have been adjusted for inflation (base year 1989). To reduce the weight of outliers we 
exclude one percent of the observations.
8 Data on management, ownership, and control were 
                                                 
8 We use the absolute deviation between change in total market value and investment: (Mt Mt 1)/Mt 1 and It/Mt 1. We 
exclude one percent of the observations (15 obs.). In effect this removes observations that contain large errors.   14 
obtained from the SIS Ownership Data Corporation databases: SIS Board and Auditor and SIS 
Owners and Power in Sweden’s Listed Companies. Information on founders was collected from 
each firm’s annual reports and websites. In the cases where the information was not available, 
the firms were personally contacted to guarantee correct information.  
 
Results 
Sweden is dominated by firms with highly concentrated ownership structures with a strong 
presence of family ownership. Many of the larger companies on the Stockholm Stock Exchange 
are controlled by a family (Agnblad, Berglöf, Högfeldt, & Svancar, 2001; Högfeldt, 2005).  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics with respect to family and non family firms. Due to 
our narrow definition of what constitutes a family firm only 30 percent of the sample firms are 
classified as family firms. The first group, non family firms, contains 1021 observations. In this 
group, the largest owner on average controls 30 percent of the voting rights and 23 percent of the 
cash flow rights. That is, on average, excess votes equal 7 percent among these firms.   
Approximately  54  percent  of  the  non family  firm  group  has  a  vote differentiated  share 
structure. The average firm has a mean annual increase of its market value of 15 percent. The 
high value is due to the very good performance of some firms, as shown by the median value, 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics, non-family firms 
 
Variables  Mean  Median  Std.  Min.  Max.  Obs.   
Capital (%)  22.69  19.90  14.23  1.2  81.60  1021   
Votes (%)  30.04  26.60  17.79  1.0  89.90  1021   
Vote diff. (%)  54.00  1  50.00  0.00  1.00  1021   
Excess vote (%)  7.36  0  12.46   30.00  49.10  1021   
Market value (MSEK)  7 993.00  930.89  26 628.28  4.20  429 901.90  1021   
∆Market value (%)  15.00  6.00  59.00   93.00  330  1021   
Investment intensity (%)  22.00  18.00  33.00   124  259  1021   
Sales (MSEK)  6 259.83  958.46  13 487.74  0  104 936.30  1021   
 
We then turn to descriptive statistics for family firms (Table 3). The average family firm 
has a largest owner who controls almost 50 percent of the voting rights and 31 percent of the 
cash flow rights. Further, excess votes are higher; on average the largest owner has an excess 
vote  of  17  percent.  Almost  80  percent  of  the  family  firms  have  a  vote differentiated  share 
structure. Some interesting features appear when comparing family controlled firms with non 
family controlled firms. For example, the ownership structure is much more concentrated in 
family  firms.  On  average,  the  largest  owner  in  a  family  firm  has  a  substantially  greater 
ownership stake than the largest owner in non family firms. The largest owner in family firms 
controls on average 48 percent of the voting rights, the corresponding value in non family firms 
is about 30 percent. In terms of cash flow rights, the largest owner in family firms controls on 
average 24.1 percent, in non family firms the largest owner only controls on average 22 percent 
of the cash flow rights. Hence, the difference in excess votes is about 10 percent. The findings 
are consistent with previous studies, such as that of Bjuggren and Palmberg (2009).  
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics, family firms 
 
Variables  Mean  Median  Std.  Min.  Max.  Obs.   
Founder management  35.00  0  0.48  0  1  497   
Descendant management   29.00  0  0.45  0  1  497   
External management  36.00  0  0.48  0  1  497   
Capital (%)  31.32  29.00  15.68  0.70  74.10  497   
Votes (%)  47.80  46.40  19.42  5.00  93.70  497   
Vote differentiation  78.00  1.00  41.00  0  1  497   
Excess vote (%)  16.48  18.50  13.43   12.90  44.40  497   
Market value (MSEK)  2 742.23  455.64  8 083.46  7.36  76 417.63  497   
∆ Market value (%)  17.00  8.00  55.00   97.00  436  497   
Investment intensity (%)  24.00  18.00  39.00   86.00  328  497   
Sales (MSEK)  1 806.58  562.24  4 370.43  0.00  34 516.36  497   
Note: The variable Family firm is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the firm is a family firm and zero 
otherwise. Variables one to three are dummy variables taking the value 1 if the CEO or COB is (1) the founder of 
the firm, (2) a descendent of the founder, or (3) an external manager with no family connection, and 0 otherwise.  
 
Furthermore, family firms tend to be smaller in terms of market value than non family firms. 
This  can  also  be  seen  from  the  size  of  investments.  Non family  firms  invest  on  average 
SEK1,977 million a year whereas family firms invest SEK490 million. Appendix 1, Table A1 
provides a correlation matrix of the investigated variables.  
 
Regression Results 
We use a panel data methodology to estimate the effects of family ownership, control, and 
management on returns on investment. More specifically, a fixed effects model with time and 
firm effects is applied. A fixed effect model is theoretically appropriate in this case, since we 
investigate the same firms over time; the choice of model is also supported by the Hausman test. 
Table 4 presents the results of the estimated marginal q for family and non family firms. The 
estimated  marginal  q for  family  and  non family  firms  is  1.042  and  0.948,  respectively.  The   17 
values indicate that Swedish listed firms on average have made efficient investments (Table 4). 
The result suggests that it is not possible to reject hypothesis 1, that family firms have a superior 
investment  performance  over  non family  firms.  Compared  to  findings  in  earlier  research  on 
Sweden, the estimated average marginal q is, however, somewhat higher. For a similar set of 
Swedish firms, but for a shorter period, Bjuggren et al. (2007) find a marginal q of 0.89. In an 
international comparison study, Gugler et al. (2004a) estimate the marginal q for Swedish firms 
at 0.65. 
Models  1  and  2  also  test  hypothesis  2,  that  dual class  shares  drive  a  wedge  between 
ownership and control. The variable excess votes have a significant and negative sign in both 
types of firms. The negative effect of dual class shares is particularly  pronounced in family 
firms. As shown in the descriptive statistics (Tables 2 and 3), the controlling owner in family 
firms has on average excess votes of 16.48 percent, compared to only 7.36 percent in non family 
firms. The result is also in line with previous research. In a recent study, Bjuggren et al., (2010) 
demonstrate  that  dual class  shares  have  a  significant  negative  effect  on  firm  investment 
performance.  Cronqvist  &  Nilsson  (2003)  and  Villalonga  &  Amit  (2006)  investigate  family 
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R sq: overall 
 
0.124  0.200 
F value 
 
117.08  94.08 
Observations 
 
1021  497 
No. of firms 
 
172  85 
Marginal q (mean)  1.042  0.948 
Notes: *, **, *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. T statistics in 
parentheses, robust standard errors are used. The regression is a fixed effect estimation with time and group effects. 
Marginal q is evaluated at the mean value of the explanatory variables, see equation (3). Marginal q (mean) is a 
calculated value using the average values of excess votes from Table 2 and Table 3. Marginal q for non family 
firms: 1.065 (0.003*7.36) = 1.042, and marginal q for family firms: 1.278 (0.019*16.48).   
 
Table five presents the regression results for founder (model 4), descendant (model 5), and 
external management in family firms (model 6). The regression estimate of the dummy variable 
controlling for founder management is insignificant, which implies that family firms that are 
managed  by  the  founder  perform  in  the  same  way  as  the  average  Swedish  listed  firm.  The 
finding rejects hypothesis 3, which states that family founding management has a positive impact 
on  firm  investment  performance.  Model  5  reports  that  the  It/Mt-1*descendant  parameter  is 
negative and significant. That is, a descendant management in a family firm has a negative effect 
on the firm’s investment performance. These firms have an average marginal q of 0.4, indicating 
heavy over investment. The result supports hypothesis 4. Descendant managed family firms are 
in general badly managed and invest in projects associated with a negative net present value. A 
marginal q less than one indicates bad corporate governance, which in turn has a negative effect 
on the returns on investment.    19 
Confirming hypothesis 5, that external management enhances firm investment performance, 
model  6  shows  that  an  external  management  has  a  positive  and  significant  impact  on  the 
investment performance in founding family firms. These firms have an average marginal q equal 
to 1.273 indicating under investment. That is, there is room for further investments in order to 
maximize firm value.  
 
Table 5. Founder, Descendant, or External Management in Family Firms  
 
Dependent variable:  
(Mt -Mt-1)/Mt-1 
 















   0.013 
( 0.11) 




     0.805*** 
( 4.81) 
 
It/Mt-1*External management  
 
 












R square overall  0.174  0.174  0.191  0.198 
F value 
 
169.67  84.79  101.10  92.38 
Observations 
 
497  497  497  497 
No. of firms  85  85  85  85 
Marginal q (mean)  0.992  0.984  0.337  1.273 
*. **. *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. Standard errors are used 
in calculating t statistics (in parentheses). The regression is a fixed effect estimation with time and industry effects.
 
Marginal q is evaluated with coefficient weights equal to one.  
 
To  sum  up,  the  results  show  no  effect  of  founder  management  in  family  firms,  whereas 
descendant managed firms are associated with over investments. External managers in family 
firms are associated with signs of under investments, meaning that the return on investments 
made  by  the  firms  is  significantly  higher  than  the  firms’  cost  of  capital.  Although  further 
investigation concerning the role of control instruments such as dual class shares is needed, the   20 
results of this study support the view that control instruments drastically alter the incentives of 
controlling owners and managers. 
The  result  regarding  founder,  descendant  and  external  management  differ  somewhat 
compared  to  previous  research.  In  line  with  studies  using  Anglo Saxon  data,  Barontini  and 
Caprio,  (2006)  find  a  positive  impact  of  founder  CEOs  for  continental  European  firm 
performance, where firm performance is measured in terms of Tobin’s q or as return on assets. 
When performing the analysis country by country, the only results available for Sweden are 
when the controlling family owner acts as the CEO of the firm, which has a positive effect on 
firm performance (Barontini and Caprio, 2006).  The results regarding descendant and external 
management are in line with the by Villalonga and Amit (2006 a b).  
 
Conclusions 
There  are  a  large  number  of  studies  investigating  how  family  ownership,  control,  and 
management affect the performance of firms. Few studies, however, have been made on data 
relevant to the continental European corporate governance model, characterized by concentrated 
ownership and extensive use of control instruments such as dual class shares.  
We  investigate  three  management  structures  related  to  family  ownership;  founder 
management, descendant management, and external management.  We use the identity of the 
CEO  and  COB  to  show  under  what  type  of  management  the  family  firm  is.  To  assess 
performance,  we use  a  measure  of  Tobin’s marginal  q, which  solves  many  of the  problems 
associated with conventional performance measures such as market to book measures of Tobin’s 
average q. Marginal q measures the returns on investment relative to the cost of capital.  
The results for founder managed family firms showed no significant positive relation with the 
investment  performance  of  the  firms.  Previous  research  has  found  a  positive  relationship   21 
between the founder and firm performance measured as Tobin’s q or return on assets. Second, 
we examine the effect of a descendant manager in family firms. The results show a negative link 
between  descendants  as  managers  and  the  investment  performance  of  firms.  Our  findings 
corroborate  the  study  by  Pérez González  (2006).  The  value  of  marginal  q  implies  over 
investments, i.e., investments with returns below the cost of capital. The results indicate that a 
descendant is often given the managerial position due to his/her bond to the family and not 
explicitly  due  to  his/her  skills.  Lastly,  we  examine  the  effects  on  performance  of  external 
managers without family affiliation. The results show a positive and significant effect of external 
managers on the investment performance of family firms.    22 
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Appendix 
Derivation of marginal q from Tobin’s q  
Marginal q can be derived from the net present value rule of investments as in the original paper 
by Mueller and Reardon (1993). Alternatively, marginal q can be derived from Tobin’s q, where 
Tobin’s average q, qa, is defined as the market value, Mt, divided by the replacement cost of the 
firm capital at time t, Kt: 
 
t a t t q K M , / =                   (a) 
 
This measures the average return on the capital relative to the cost of capital. If qa is above 
one, this implies that the firm should invest further. However, for adjustments of the capital 
stock, the marginal return on capital is more relevant. Marginal q measures the marginal return 
on  capital,  i.e.,  investments.  Marginal  q,  qm,  can  be  derived  from  Tobin’s  average  q.  The 






















              (b) 
 
where –δ  is the depreciation rate. The market value in period t can be written as: 
t t t t t M PV M M   δ + − + = − − 1 1               (c) 
 
where PVt is the present value of the cash flows that investments in period t, It, generate, and 
 t is a standard error term. The net present value rule of investments stipulates that investments 
should be made up to the point where  PVt = It. This implies that PVt/It = 1, which can be 
rewritten as PVt/It = qm. By dividing both sides of equation (c) with Mt 1 and rearranging it, we 
get the empirically testable equation (1). Equation (1) assumes that the capital market is efficient 
in the sense that future cash flows are unbiased estimates. As t grows larger, the term  t /Mt 1 will 
approach 0. For more details on the derivation, properties, and estimation techniques of marginal 
q, see Mueller & Reardon (1993) and Gugler & Yurtoglu (2003).   25 
Table A1   Correlation Matrix 
Variables  Family 
firm 




(Mt Mt 1) 
/Mt 1 
It/Mt 1  Sales 
Family firm  1                       
Founder  0.52*  1                     
Descendant   0.46*   0.12*  1                   
External  0.52*   0.13*   0.12*  1                 
Capital  0.27*  0.13*  0.17*  0.10*  1               
Votes  0.41*  0.18*  0.27*  0.17*  0.74*  1             
Vote diff.  0.23*  0.13*  0.14*  0.08*  0.03  0.42*  1           
Excess votes  0.32*  0.13*  0.21*  0.14*   0.02  0.65*  0.60*  1         
Market value   0.11*   0.08*   0.003   0.08*   0.01  0.07*  0.04  0.11*  1       
(Mt Mt 1)/Mt 1  0.02   0.01  0.006  0.03  0003   0.02   0.05   0.04  0.04  1     
It/Mt 1  0.03  0.01   0.01  0.04  0.05  0.06*  0.02  0.03   0.01  0.37*  1   
Sales   0.18*   0.12*   0.06*   0.09*   0.06*  0.02  0.07*  0.10*  0.77*   0.03  0.02  1 
Debt   0.19*   0.10*   0.08*   0.10*   0.08*  0.004  0.08*  0.10*  0.61*  0.09  0.004  0.83* 
* indicates significant correlation at 5 percent.  26 
 